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A Four Year Statute Of Limitations For
Medical Malpractice Cases: Will
Plaintiff's Case Be Barred?
During the 1970 session, the California Legislature enacted a
specific statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions in
California. On its face, the statute appears to be a maximum four
year limitation from the time of the actionable conduct. This
comment examines the meaning of this statute of limitations and
endeavors to identify the "legislative intent" by reviewing the history
of the progress of the bill during the session and the significant
developments during committee and floor hearings. The writer
points out there is significant evidence to suggest the legislature did
not intend to protect the medical profession at the expense of the
injured plaintiff with a four year maximum limitation in all cases.
In addition, some of the possible exceptions established by earlier
case law are analyzed from the standpoint of their application
under the new law.
As a result of the abundant malpractice litigation in the United
States, a number of basic affirmative defenses have evolved and are
available to the practicing physician in a suit for malpractice.1 An often
asserted defense is the running of the statute of limitations.
The law requires a person who is injured by another to seasonably
pursue legal redress.' The reasons for this policy are evident: With the
passage of time, it becomes increasingly difficult to prove that the de-
fendant in fact exercised due care; and, if sufficient time elapses, it may
become impossible to determine whether plaintiff's injury resulted from
1. 'Malpractice,' sometimes called 'malapraxis', is a term of broad signifi-
cance. It is defined as any professional misconduct or any unreasonable lack
of skill of fidelity in the performance of professional or fiduciary duties;
illegal or immoral conduct; improper or immoral conduct; misbehavior; wrong-
doing; evil, bad, objectionable, or wrong practice; evil practices, acts, or do-
ings; illegal or unethical practice; practice contrary to established rules; prac-
tice contrary to rules.
54 C.J.S. Malpractice, 1111 (1948). For a discussion of available defenses see Note,
Medical Malpratcice: A Survey of Statutes of Limitation, 3 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 597,
604-606 (1969).
2. Note, Medical Malpractice: A Survey of Statutes of Limitation, 3 SUFFOLK
U.L. REv. 597, 606 (1969).
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the negligence of the defendant.' Thus, the general purpose of a statute
of limitations 4 is to bar "stale" claims.5 This gives the alleged tort-
feasor freedom from having the threat of a lawsuit hanging over his
head indefinitely' and therefore ultimately promotes certainty and fair-
ness. The successfully asserted statute of limitations represents the
physician's most effective defense to an action for malpractice as it is a
complete bar to recovery.7
In 1872, California enacted a code section which set forth the maxi-
mum time for commencing certain civil actions. As originally enacted,
the pertinent subdivision of the Code of Civil Procedure section 340
read: "Within one year: subdivision 3., an action for libel, slander, as-
sault, battery, or false imprisonment. . ... 8 This section did not in-
clude a civil action for negligence.
In order to include medical malpractice, this section was amended in
1905 to include an action "for injury to or for the death of one caused
by the wrongful act or neglect of another. . ... 9 The section em-
braced all infringments of personal rights10 as opposed to transgressions
of property rights.
Because the statute did not specifically mention medical malpractice
suits per se, it was classed as a general statute of limitations for personal
injury claims in tort actions. The California Supreme Court in Krebe-
nios v. Lindauer" declared that an action by a patient against a physi-
cian for injuries sustained by reason of the physician's negligent or un-
skillful treatment was governed by subdivision 3; this precedent was
continuously followed.' 2 However, the broad and general wording of
3. This is particularly significant in personal injury actions because of the
perishable nature of the claims. Note, Malpractice and the Statute of Limitations, 32
IND. L.J. 528 (1957); Note, Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitations, 63
HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1185 (1950).
4. The major purpose of statutes of limitations is to ensure fairness to defendants.
See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-349
(1944):
Statutes of limitation . in their conclusive effects are designed to promote
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim
it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of
limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to pre-
vail over the right to prosecute them.
5. Recent Decisions, 18 WESTE REs. L. Rnv. 1002 (1967).
6. Note, Statute of Limitations-Medical Malpractice, 6 WAKE FOREST INTR. L.
REV. 532, 535 (1970).
7. See note 2 supra at 606.
8. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 340.
9. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 340, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1905, c. 258, p. 232
(S.B. 701 as authored and introduced by Senator Lukens).
10. Simmons v. Edouarde, 98 Cal. App. 2d 826, 828 (1950).
11. 175 Cal. 431 (1917).
12. Johnson v. Nolan, 105 Cal. App. 293 (1930); Stafford v. Schultz, 42 Cal. 2d
767, 775 (1954).
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this section did not provide for a method of determining when the cause
of action arose; nor did it provide a method for determining when the
statute commenced to run.
Interpretation Prior to 1936
Prior to 1936, the California courts applied a strict interpretation
of the statute of limitations in malpractice cases. The original injury
was held to be the sole cause of action. Subsequent acts, while they
might aggravate the damage done, merely "attached" to the original in-
jury without becoming independent causes of action. 3 Moreover, sub-
sequent aggravation of the injury did not revive the action if the original
injury was otherwise barred; 14 or in other words, the statute began to
run on the date of the wrongful act or omission constituting the mal-
practice.' 5
A plaintiff could bring an action for malpractice only if he were fortu-
nate enough to discover the wrong within one year after its commis-
sion. 6 Thus, the narrow reading of the statute often denied the plain-
tiff a satisfactory means of redress.' 7
Interpretation from 1936 to 1970
In 1936, the California Supreme Court in the landmark case of
Huysman v. Kirsch's recognized the injustice of the strict view and rede-
fined the point in time when a cause of action "accrues" in medical mal-
practice cases. In Huysman, a surgeon left a drainage tube in the abdo-
men of a patient who, despite the pain, continued under the physician's
care for some 20 months before the physician opened the incision and
removed the tubing. The court held that the action was not barred for
the statute of limitations did not start running until the removal of the
tubing. 19 This decision overruled the traditional interpretation and made
knowledge the basis for the commencement of the statute of limita-
tions.2 °
13. Wetzel v. Pius, 78 Cal. App. 104, 107 (1926); Johnson v. Nolan, 105 Cal.
App. 293, 294 (1930). See also Recent Decisions, Physicians and Surgeons: Malprac-
tice: Statute of Limitations, 20 CALIF. L. REv. 660 (1932).
14. Recent Decisions, supra note 13.
15. 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 60 (1951).
16. This rule of law was, however, the object of repeated criticism. It has been
shown that promptness of action presupposes knowledge of the existence of conditions
which warrant such action, and that it is unreasonable to expect a person to bring suit
for malpractice until he has actual knowledge of facts which constitute the wrong.
H. OPPENHErMER, A TREATISE ON MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 113 (1935).
17. See Recent Decisions, supra note 5, at 1006.
18. 6 Cal. 2d 302 (1936).
19. Id. at 312.
20. Id. See Recent Recisions, 24 CALnI. L. REv. 607, 608 (1936).
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The cases have uniformly followed the Huysman "discovery" rule
and have expanded it by establishing new exceptions.21 Thus, the courts
have held that the statute does not commence to run while the physician
and patient relationship continues;22 or, until the plaintiff discovers the
injury, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discov-
ered it,28 whether such actual or constructive discovery occurs prior to or
after termination of the physician-patient relationship;24 or, if there is
an act or omission on the part of the physician which would toll or inter-
rupt the running of the statute or estop the physician from asserting
that the action is barred.25
In the years subsequent to 1936, the courts have made knowledge
the basis for commencing the statutory period and have evolved on a
continuing path of liberalization in the interpretation of Code of Civil
Procedure section 340. This liberal interpretation apparently has di-minished the effectiveness of the statute of limitations. Consequently,
considerable pressure has been asserted by various interest groups who
desire restriction on potential plaintiffs.
Present Malpractice Crisis
Since the end of World War II, all litigation has expanded. This has
been succinctly termed the "law explosion". 26  In such an era, the
number of medical malpractice lawsuits would be expected to have risen
proportionately; instead, they have risen out of proportion.27  There
21. See generally Annot, 74 A.L.R. 1317 (1931); Annot., 144 A.L.R. 209
(1943); Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368 (1961).
22. The rationale is that during such a relationship the patient does not ordinarily
have knowledge of negligent treatment by the physician upon whose skill, judgment
and advice he continues to rely. Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 312 (1936);
M, yers v. Stevenson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 399, 401 (1954). See generally Recent Deci-
sions, 37 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 385 (1963); Sacks, Statute of Limitations in Undiscovered
Malpractice, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. Ruv. 65, 67-68 (1967).
23. Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 312 (1936); Stafford v. Shultz, 42 Cal. 2d
767, 778 (1954); Hundley v. St. Francis Hospital, 161 Cal. App. 2d 800, 806 (1958);
Howe v. Pioneer Mfg. Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 330, 342 (1968). See note 2 supra, at
614. Whether the appellant should have reasonably discovered his condition and its
cause at an earlier time, and whether he should have sought further advice as to that
condition is a question of fact. Zelver v. Sequoia Hospital District, 7 Cal. App. 3d 934,
943 (1970).
24. Petrucci v. Heidenreich, 43 Cal. App. 2d 561, 562 (1941).
25. Calvin v. Thayer, 150 Cal. App. 2d 610, 615 (1957). The tolling factors
include fraudulent concealment of the facts with implicit or express representation,
continuing tort, continuing duty, or a progressive and accumulated injury. See Stafford
v. Schultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 779 (1954); Warrington v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274
Cal. App. 2d 564, 568 (1969). See generally Note, Malpractice and the Statute of
Limitations, 32 IND. L.J. 528, 535-540 (1957).
26. Morris, Response to Ribicoff: Malpractice Suits v. Patient Care, 2 INS.
CoUNsEL J. 206, 213 (1970). There is a graphic portrayal of the development of
malpractice litigation in an article by Sandor, The History of Professional Liability
Suits In The United States, 163 J.A.M.A. 459, 461-463 (1957).
27. Morris, supra note 26. Medical professional liability claims were relatively
insignificant until 1930. However, they arose tenfold in the decade 1930 to 1940 and
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are several reasons for the increase in medical malpractice lawsuits
which contribute to the present malpractice crisis.
Most suits are the result of injuries suffered by patients during medi-
cal treatment or surgery and are justifiable from the standpoint that the
patient, as a result of the alleged negligence or incompetence of the
physician, did suffer extra pain and suffering.28 Some malpractice
suits are the indirect result of a deterioration in physician-patient rap-
port.29  The breakdown in the physician-patient relationship is often
created by the defendant physician himself who has told his patient
so little about his progress that the patient worries and seeks quasi-
medical advice from others; or, told him too much; or, neglected him or
his emotional needs.30 In such a situation a malpractice suit is likely
to follow.3" Another factor is that doctors are few in supply and so
great in demand.32 The result is "a pressure cooker of overworked
physicians, high caseloads, short-cut precautions and substandard treat-
ment.'' 33
Therefore, the present malpractice crisis arises out of complex and
dynamic relationships between law, medicine, economics and govern-
ment, all superimposed on a matrix of an inflated economy and rapidly
changing social values.34
Malpractice Crisis and California
The medical malpractice crisis has stimulated several interest groups
to suggest solutions to the problem. The spectrum of controversy has
another tenfold from 1940 to 1950. Since 1950, judgments in the six figures have be-
come uncomfortably commonplace. An AMA survey in 1957 found that one out of ev-
ery seven physicians was a defendant in a professional liability action. Committee on
Medicolegal Problems, Professional Liability & The Physician, 183 J.A.M.A. 695
(1963).
28. Ribicoff, Medical Malpractice: The Patient v. the Physician, 6 TRIAL 10
(1970). Poor results of surgery (other than results from directly isolable acts such as
a slip of the knife or leaving a foreign body in an operative wound) fall into four
main classifications: (1) failure to cure the condition for which surgery was per-
formed, (2) undue prolongation of healing or recovery even though the final result is
satisfactory, (3) appearance of early complications such as infection in the wound
during healing, and (4) developments of late complications. See D. LOuISELL Alm
H. WILLIAMS, 1 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 112 (1970).
29. Ribicoff, supra note 28. For many years sociologists have pointed to the
increasingly impersonal nature of medical care and have warned of the negative conse-
quences of a greater likelihood of a malpractice claim. Bernzweig, Lawsuits: A
Symptom Not a Cause, 6 TRIAL 14, 15 (1970).
30. Morris, supra note 26, at 215.
31. However, if there is a high level of competence and trust, most patients
will not resort to a malpractice suit but will "ride out" the pain and suffering accom-
panying a "bad" result. Id. at 222.
32. There are less than 300,000 active doctors caring for over 200 million
Americans-about one doctor for every 700 citizens. Kelner, The Conspiracy of Si-
lence, 6 TRIAL 18 (1970).
33. Id.
34. Bernzweig, supra note 29, at 14.
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been concentrated within two opposing interest groups, the California
Medical Association (CMA) and the California Trial Lawyers Asso-
ciation (CTLA).
The CMA agrues that a major contributing factor to the increase in
malpractice litigation is that, in effect, there is no statute of limitations
for medical malpractice.35  The California courts have followed the
"discovery doctrine" which seems to place the physician in a position
where he is never free from the threat of a malpractice suit, regardless
of the number of years that have elapsed since the patient was treated. 30
Adverting to the premise that there is no statute of limitations in mal-
practice lawsuits, the insurance industry involved in writing malprac-
tice insurance must maintain huge reserves, paid for by physicians, to
protect themselves against the possibility of a potentially disastrous mal-
practice suit which is commenced several years from the date of injury.8"
Consequently, there has been a significant increase in the amount of
premiums imposed on physicians. 8  Physicians, as do other business-
men, pass on their operating costs, including insurance, to their custo-
mers-the patients. 39
The CMA proposed a solution to the problem by sponsoring new leg-
islation designed to reduce the premiums of malpractice insurance for
the medical profession. 40  The insurance companies will not be re-
quired to establish and maintain the large reserves year-after-year, but
rather they will be able to restrict their reserves in accordance with the
four-year limitation period.41 The reduction of reserves will effect
35. Interview with J. Michael Allen, Director of Governmental Relations of the




39. Uhthoff, Medical Malpractice-The Insurance Scene, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
578, 579 (1969).
40. The bill was authored and introduced by Senator Gordon Cologne, R-Indio.
S.B. 362, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 360, § 1, p. 771:
An act to add Section 340.5 to the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to limi-
tation of actions. The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
Section 1. Section 340.5 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure, to read:
340.5 In an action for injury or death against a physician or surgeon,
dentist, registered nurse, dispending optician, optometrist, registered physical
therapist, podiatrist, licensed psychologist, osteopath, chiropractor, clinical
laboratory bio-analyst, clinical laboratory technologist, veterinarian, or a li-
censed hospital as the employer of any such person, based upon such person's
alleged negligence, or for rendering professional services without consent, or
for error or omission in such person's practice, four years after the date of
injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reason-
able diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever first occurs. This
time limitation shall be tolled for any period during which such person has
failed to disclose any act, error, or omission upon which such action is based
and which is known or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
been known to him.
41. Letter from Senator Gordon Cologne to Governor Ronald Reagan, June 29,
1970, on file in California State Capitol Building, Room 3070.
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economies in the cost of malpractice insurance which may be carried
over to patients and the general public.4"
The California Trial Lawyers Association (CTLA) was the most for-
midable opposition. The comprehensive scope of the legislation was
criticized as favoring a specific profession in that it establishes preferen-
tial treatment for a specific profession by reducing responsibilities for
error, and unfairly deprives the injured plaintiff of his legal redress.
43
Evolution of the New Statute
New legislation was introduced each year from 1968 through 1970;
however, until 1970 no legislation was passed into law.44 Each bill in-
troduced during this three-year period was designed to implement a stat-
ute of limitations for medical malpractice suits.
45
The 1970 bill was amended twice before it was signed into law.46
As introduced, the legislation provided for a statute of limitations of
four years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the injury, whichever first occurs.47
Thus, there would have been an absolute four year period from the date
of injury during which to commence the action. This four year period
would not have considered the physician's failure to disclose any act or
error which was known or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have been known to him.
The bill, as introduced, drew harsh criticism from its opponents,
in particular, the California Trial Lawyers Association (CTLA). Their
arguments were not without sympathetic support from the staff and
members of the Judiciary Committee.48
On April 17, 1970, during an open hearing of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, the CTLA asserted, among other arguments, that the original
form of the bill would severely limit the right of recovery for the in-
jured plaintiff who is not responsible for the delay in filing a claim be-
cause fraudulent concealment may be present.49  Though some mem-
42. Id.
43. Interview with William H. Lally, Legislative Director of the California Trial
Lawyers Association, in Sacramento, California, January 11, 1971. [Hereinafter cited
as Lally].
44. A.B. 1071, 1968 Regular Session; S.B. 678, 1968 Regular Session. A.B. 135,
1969 Regular Session. S.B. 362, 1970 Regular Session.
45. Id.
46. S.B. 362, 1970 Regular Session, as amended, April 17, 1970 and April 27,
1970.
47. S.B. 362, 1970 Regular Session, as introduced, February 12, 1970.
48. Interview with Herbert Nobriga, Chief Counsel, Assembly Judiciary Com-
mittee in Sacramento, California, April 12, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Nobriga].
49. Lally.
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bers of the Committee strongly asserted their belief that a statute of
limitations was justified and necessary to prevent indefinite exposure to
claims, a compromise was reached and the bill passed out of committee
with the resulting amendment. 50 The amended version provided for a
tolling factor which stated that the "time limitation shall be tolled for
any period during which such person [medical practitioner] has inten-
tionally concealed any act, error, or omission upon which such action
is based." 51 The first amended version, therefore, provided for a tolling
of the statute of limitations only when there was an intentional conceal-
ment of an error by the medical practitioner. This version would not
have tolled the statute of limitations for any unintentional concealment
of an error.
The harshness of the bill was partially removed by the tolling ame nd-
ment; however, the CTLA remained unsatisfied and contended that
the burden of proof was insurmountable due to the plaintiff's difficulty
in proving that the physician had actual knowledge of his negligence.5 2
Further, the CTLA argued that the public should not be subjected to any
solution that requires innocent victims to bear the cost of unintentional
but careless human error.5 3 The continued effort of the CTLA to muster
support for the injured party who might be deprived of his just recovery
culminated in a second compromising amendment on the floor of the
senate on April 27, 1970. The second amended version provided that
the statute shall be tolled whenever the practitioner has "failed to dis-
close any act, error, or omission upon which such action is based and
which is known or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
been known to him."'' Thus it is apparent that the bill, as enacted into
law, still provides for intentional non-disclosure as it used the phrase
"known . . . to him."' i However, it also provides for tolling when
there is an unintentional failure to disclose which seems to impose a
burden on the physician to discover his error. This can be determined
from the portion of the bill which provides for tolling when failure to
disclose is the result of lack of reasonable diligence by the practitioner
in discovering his error.56
It is apparent that the bill became more liberal in its application as it
progressed through the amendment process. This liberalization would
appear to be the result of the legislature's overriding concern for the
50. Nobriga.
51. S.B. 362, 1970 Regular Session, as amended, April 17, 1970.
52. Lally.
53. Id.
54. S.B. 362, 1970 Regular Session, as amended, April 27, 1970.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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meritorious claim which would have been barred by the original abso-
lute limitation period.57 It would seem that the legislature intended to
allow the courts some latitude in applying the statute of limitations.58
In fact, the California Trial Lawyers Association believes that the
amendments have considerably reduced the harshness of the bill by al-
lowing the courts considerable leeway in applying the tolling factor. 9
Another inference that the legislature was concerned about meri-
torious claims can be drawn from the legislation introduced in 1969.
This bill would have provided that
the applicable limit of time specified in this code for the commence-
ment of action shall be calculated from the date of the alleged
wrongful act, and not from any other date, except only upon proof
of fraud or intentional concealment."0
This in effect would have provided for a one year statute of limitations
which could only be tolled in the event of intentional non-disclosure. It
is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the rationale behind the result-
ant liberal statute was the concern for the bona fide claim which would
be barred by an absolute limitation.
Practical Effect of the New Statute
The new section's impact on existing law appears to be of some sig-
nificance. The actual effect of the statute has not been determined as
no points of controversy have been litigated under it.
Since the statute is an attempt to limit the period within which a suit
for malpractice might be brought to a maximum of four years after the
"date of injury, or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, which-
ever occurs first,"'61 the effect is not to alter existing law for injuries
discovered within three years from the date of injury. Any injury dis-
covered within the first three years must of necessity be consumated in
a legal action within four years, or it is barred by the one year from dis-
covery limitation; thus, since the previous law was limited to one
year from discovery, there is no change in existing law for an in-
jury discovered within the first three years. However, for injuries dis-
covered between the third and fourth year after the injury, the in-
jured patient must assert a cause of action within that one year period




60. A.B. 135, 1969 Regular Session.
61. See note 40 supra.
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does not apply. Of course, any claim discovered after four years would
now be barred.
The potential impact on the number of claims which will be barred
may be brought into proper perspective through analysis of the number
of claims reported against [Allopathic] physicians in Southern Cali-
fornia.62 A reasonable approximation may be made by computing the
percentage of claims discovered during the first three years, between the
third and fourth years, and after four years from the date of injury.
There is little reason to assume the time required for discovery will fluc-
tuate much during the next few years.
The number of claims reported during the policy years from 1951
through 1965 was 4,934.63 The number of claims reported within
three years from the date of injury was 4,032 or 81.82 percent. 4 The
claimants within this group will not be affected. These plaintiffs still
have to file within one year from discovery, which of necessity will be
within four years.
The 448 claims, 9.08 percent, reported during the period of three to
four years from the date of injury will not be adversely affected if
these claimants are diligent and file their claims within the diminishing
period of the fourth year.65 An undetermined number of these will un-
doubtedly be barred, due to the lack of diligence of the plaintiff in re-
poiting the injury.
The number of claims reported after four years from the date of in-
jury was 454.66 This group of 9.20 percent will be barred by the
statute.
The vast majority of claims being reported within the four year period
suggests that the new section will have minimal impact on the medi-
cal malpractice problem and equally slight impact on medical malprac-
tice insurance. However, it seems reasonable that at least some of the
claims arising after the 4 year period will be barred unjustly. That is,
they will not be "stale" regarding the right, only regarding the discovery
of the wrong. 9.20 percent of all claims may be barred. Is this de-
sirable social policy?
Arguably, the social policy of limiting claims will not be served in
such cases-especially where evidence indicates the patient was at a sub-
stantial disadvantage in making discovery of the malpractice. The
62. From figures submitted by the Nettleship Company to Senator Gordon Co-
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counterbalancing strong social policy to permit an injured plaintiff to re-
cover for his losses should outweigh the 4 year maximum time limitation
in some cases.
Tolling the Statute
The phraseology of the tolling factor suggests that the legislature may
have intended to allow the California courts latitude in applying the new
statute. To invoke the tolling section, the use of reasonable diligence
by the medical practitioner in discovering the harm is crucial. If the
harm could have been discovered by the use of reasonable diligence
within four years from the date of injury, the limitation period is tolled,
no circumvention is necessary, and claims arising after the period may
be asserted. If the harm could not have been discovered by the use of
reasonable diligence within four years, the statute will bar the claim.
The pressing issue then becomes: under what physician-patient rela-
tionships might it be possible for the physician, by the use of rea-
sonable diligence, to discover the injury within four years?
There are three theories an injured person conceivably may utilize
to invoke the tolling section for a claim which is discovered after the
four year limitation period. Under prior law, California courts used the
"continuing physician-patient relationship" to circumvent the former
statute of limitations. 67 The physician-patient relationship may con-
tinue for an indefinite period beyond a course of treatment for an ac-
tionable injury merely by treatment that is entirely unrelated to the ac-
tionable injury or its after cause.68 This exception evolved from the
Huysman case and stands for the premise that, in any case, the continu-
ing relationship of the doctor and patient, with the patient's accompany-
ing reliance on the doctor for information, postpones the running of
the statute against the ignorant plaintiff until the relationship termi-
nates. 9
A patient may be unable to rely upon the acts of his physician dur-
ing the continuing relationship to toll the statute under certain cir-
cumstances.
A California court stated in Hirschman v. Saxon that the fiduciary
physician-patient relationship terminates when the patient failed to keep
scheduled appointments and never thereafter returned for further treat-
ment. Thus, he may not assert the continuing relationship as an ex-
67. See note 22 supra.
68. LOUISELL AND WILLIAMS, 1 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 389 (1970). [hereinafter
cited as LouISELL].
69. Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 312 (1936). See also, WlrmN, CAL-
IFORNIA PROCEDuRE, Actions, § 133 (1954).
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ception.70 The court further stated that where the patient wrote the
physician alleging misconduct but failed to take legal action in re-
spect to the alleged malpractice until a year and one half later, the one
year period of limitations was applicable and the patient's claim was
barred.
71
A second possible exception is the "end of treatment theory." Un-
der this theory, the statute may be tolled until the end of treatment, even
though the wrongful act causing the injury is clearly determinable, if it
has been followed by subsequent treatment of the injury or by continu-
ation of the treatment out of which the injury arose.71
A final possible exception is another form of the "end of treatment"
doctrine and is known as the "continuing negligence" theory. This
theory is based on a continuous and daily breach of the physician's duty
by his failure to discover or correct the wrongful injury. The statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the commission of the last negli-
gent act. 73 Huysman seems to utilize the continuing negligence reason-
ing; but appears to develop a new twist to the rationale-namely that
the former statute began to run at the time a foreign body was removed
by a physician who left it in the patient during a prior operation. 74
This reasoning was not necessary in view of the "discovery doctrine"
and the theory was criticized as tending to confine its application to situ-
ations in which a surgeon left a foreign object inside his patient. 75 How-
ever, this reasoning may be useful in circumventing the new statute.
For optimum results in application, the exceptions should be brought
within the language of the tolling factor. The pivotal issue in utilizing
any of the three exceptions is whether the injury is "known or through
the use of reasonable diligence should have been known" to the medical
practitioner. The physician-patient relationship should come within
the purview of the statute since the relationship is continuing and the
physician should be able to discover the harm through the use of rea-
sonable diligence. A patient would seldom not inform the medical
practioner of an injury or of continuing pain and suffering from an in-
jury. The physician would be placed on notice that the patient has not
properly responded; this would be true even though the physician is no
70. Hirschman v. Saxon, 246 Cal. App. 2d 589, 592 (1966).
71. Id.
72. LouisELL at 374. See also DeHaan v. Winter, 247 N.W. 151 (1933);
Schmit v. Esser, 236 N.W. 622, 74 A.L.R. 1312 (1931); Dowell v. Mossberg, 355
P.2d 624 (1960); Gross v. Wise, 239 N.Y. Supp. 2d 954 (1963); McQuinn v. St.
Lawrence County Laboratory, 283 N.Y. Supp. 2d 747 (1967).
73. See Note, supra note 2, at 612.
74. Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 308 (1936).
75. Wrr=N, CALro3MA PROCEDtuE, Actions, § 133 (1954). This has been the
approach of some of the later cases. See Trombley v. Kolts, 29 Cal. App. 2d 699,
708 (1938); Ehlen v. Burrows, 51 Cal. App. 2d 141, 145 (1942).
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longer treating the patient for this injury, but rather for some totally un-
related ailment. The continuing relationship seems to require and af-
ford the physician an opportunity to discover the harm even where there
are no overt manifestations of complications.
A possible problem with this exception is that the statute requires
both the patient and physician to use reasonable diligence to discover
the injury;76 however, it would appear that this would not normally de-
feat the claimant's cause of action. Reasonable diligence requires a
medical practitioner to possess and apply that degree of skill and learn-
ing that is customarily applied in treating those similarly afflicted in
the same or similar circumstances. 7
The patient is held to that degree of care expected from a reasonable
man of ordinary prudence in the same or similar circumstances.78  Since
the medical practitioner is more highly skilled and learned than the ordi-
nary man the law demands conduct consistent with this knowledge.79
This knowledge would appear to require the medical practitioner while
the relationship is continuing, to reasonably discover the "actionable"
injury before the patient, with his lesser knowledge would discover the
injury, even if the doctor is treating the patient for a totally unrelated ail-
ment.
Also, in Hundley v. St. Francis Hospital80 the court stated that while
the physician-patient relationship continues, the patient, who is relying
upon the skill and advice of the medical practitioner is not ordinarily
placed on notice of the negligent conduct of the medical practitioner, and
unless he actually discovers the negligence, the statute does not com-
mence to run during the relationship. This is true even if the patient
knows of the condition, so long as its negligent cause is not known.81
Since the patient ordinarily is not placed on notice of the cause it would
appear that even through the use of reasonable diligence he would not
be able to discover the injury. This strengthens the conclusion that
the medical practitioner should be able to discover the injury through his
reasonable diligence before the patient would discover the injury by rea-
sonable diligence. Thus, it appears that the physician-patient relation-
ship will come within the purview of the new statute, in that it probably
affords the physician sufficient opportunity to discover the injury
within four years through the use of reasonable diligence.
76. See note 40 supra.
77. Valentin v. La Societe Franchise, 76 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5 (1946); Agnew v.
Larson, 82 Cal. App. 2d 176, 182 (1947); CAL. Jur. 2d, Physicians and Surgeons, § 69.
78. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 153 (3rd ed. 1964).
79. Id. at 164.
80. 161 Cal. App. 2d 800, 806 (1958).
81. Id.
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The second exception, the end of treatment theory, also appears to
be a valid exception. This theory is basically the same as the physi-
cian-patient relationship, except that the statute of limitations begins to
run at the end of treatment for the particular injury rather than at the
end of the total relationship. The exception's application could depend
upon the length of treatment for the actionable injury.
If the treatment is of short duration, it is possible that the physician
would not discover the injury through the use of reasonable diligence.
The longer the claimant is treated for the injury, the more probable dis-
covery through the use of reasonable diligence is.
In fact, this exception may be more practical than the physician-pa-
tient relationship. The physician is treating the actionable injury, rather
than some unrelated ailment. If the treatment continues for any sub-
stantial period, it would certainly seem that the physician should be
placed on notice that the claimant is not properly responding to treat-
ment. Thus, through the use of reasonable diligence he should be able
to discover his error.
Some cases require that there be "continuing negligence", but defen-
dant's failure to discover the wrongful injury is usually held to consti-
tute continuing negligence.8 2  This broad definition will ordinarily
bring about the same result as the rule which allows the period to begin
at the end of treatment.8 3 The cases commonly fail to state whether
some form of negligence in the subsequent treatment is required and it is
difficult to segregate the cases on this basis.84
CONCLUSION
Justice demands that the injured party be afforded a remedy; it also
demands that the defendant not be subjected to the threat of a law-
suit for an unreasonable length of time. The legislature has appar-
ently taken the position that a statute which implements a more definite
limitation period will achieve a "just" result.
The high cost of medical care includes the cost of medical malprac-
tice insurance which may be somewhat higher by reason of the prior
statute of limitations. The argument can be made that the new statute
will reduce medical costs and therefore benefit the general public.
However, the increasing cost of medical malpractice insurance may be
attributed to increasingly negligent physicians. Also, the cost may be
inflated by profit motives of the insurance industry. The new statute
82. LOUISELL at 375.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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apparently is a defense tool developed by the medical field to prevent
suits against physicians and protect and benefit the insurance carriers
rather than the injured party or the general public. However, the final
version of the statute is clearly distinguishable from the original version
and has progressed through the amendment process to the point where
a liberal interpretation may be appropriate. Previous case interpreta-
tion and social policy indicates that the four-year maximum limitation
may be applied less rigidly than the literal terms of the statute suggest.
The California courts are left with the means to balance the injured
party's rights with the public's interest in lower medical costs and achieve
"justice for all."
Paul E. Caprioglio
